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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                
No. 02-2802
                
VINCENT McGINNIS;
MELISSA McGINNIS,
 Appellants
v.
OHIO CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY
               
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 01-cv-00118)
District Judge:  Hon. J. Curtis Joyner
               
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 22, 2003
Before:  SCIRICA, Chief Judge, SLOVITER and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Filed:   May 23, 2003)
                
OPINION OF THE COURT
2SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.
In this appeal, the insureds, Vincent and Melissa McGinnis (hereafter referred to
as McGinnis), seek a new trial following a jury verdict in favor of the defendant, their
insurance company, Ohio Casualty Insurance Company.  Because we conclude that the
jury instructions were adequate and we find no other error, we will affirm.
I.
Facts and Procedure
McGinnis owns a building located at 3759 Main Street in Manayunk, a section of
Philadelphia.  The building, which houses the McGinnis retail furniture store, was built in
the side of a cliff of solid rock in 1880 and was purchased by McGinnis in 1988.  The
property was insured by Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. (hereafter “Ohio”).
On September 16, 1999, Hurricane Floyd struck the Delaware Valley.   McGinnis
filed a claim with Ohio for damages caused by the hurricane.  The parties were able to
agree as to some portions of the loss but were unable to agree on the damage that
McGinnis contends was caused when a boulder from the rock face behind the property
was dislodged as a result of Hurricane Floyd and hit the back of the building.  McGinnis
contends that, as a result, the back of the showroom becomes wet when it rains and there
is black mold and mildew.  A contractor estimated that removal of the boulder behind the
building would cost $558,000.  Ohio contends that the damage claimed did not exist, if it
did exist it didn’t occur at the time of the hurricane, and even if it did exist and occurred
3during the hurricane, it was not covered by the insurance policy.  The District Court
reserved legal issues for itself and left the factual issues for the jury, which decided in
favor of Ohio.  McGinnis appeals.
II. 
Discussion
Although McGinnis presents four separate arguments, his principal argument is
that the District Court erred by providing the jury flawed and incomplete instructions and
a confusing and incorrect verdict form.  Question 1 of the verdict form reads, “Did the
plaintiffs prove by a preponderance of the evidence that during the policy period of
January 1, 1999 to January 1, 2000 they suffered physical loss or damage to their building
(as defined by the Policy) caused by a falling rock?”  App. at 3.  The jury answered “no”
to this interrogatory.  App. at 3.  The jury was instructed that if they answered in the
affirmative they were to proceed to the second question.  Because they did not answer in
the affirmative, they did not proceed to the other questions.  
McGinnis had requested the court to add to the language of Question 1 “as a result
of the hurricane,” which the court denied.  McGinnis argues this constituted error on the
part of the District Court because without this language the question itself is misleading
and confusing.  We disagree.  The central issue was a factual one.  Question 1 was
designed to determine whether the jury found as a matter of fact that there was damage to
the building caused by a falling rock.  There was no ambiguity in the language. 
4Moreover, it was not necessary for the judge to have added the language “as a result of
the hurricane” because that was the basis of all the testimony.  In fact, in his opening, 
McGinnis’ counsel stated:
If you find that it’s just a coincidence that this boulder
fell on the day of the worst hurricane in our area’s certainly
recent history, do you think that it could have fallen any day,
it just happened to fall on this one day?
App. II at 92.  The jury found that there was no damage caused by a falling rock during
the relevant policy period; therefore, there was no need to consider the additional
questions.  Question 1 was both adequate and clear.
McGinnis’ second argument is that the jury’s negative answer to Question 1 was
contrary to the weight of the evidence.  We disagree.  Each party presented evidence. 
McGinnis presented the testimony of the furniture store manager and apparently the jury
found it to be unpersuasive.  This is not contrary to the weight of the evidence as the
manager only testified to what she heard (three crashes outside, two on the roof and the
third on the wall) but she never saw one or more boulders fall.  McGinnis also presented
testimony of two contractors, who each conceded that he did not see any damage to the
back of the building.  Ohio presented as an expert witness a civil engineer who also
testified he found no damage to the back wall by the rock fall.  Even if one accepts the
testimony of McGinnis’ witnesses, there was, at most, conflicting testimony and the jury
could decide.  It also could have taken into consideration that the building was erected in
1880.  Based on this evidence, the jury could reasonably have found that the appellants
     1 McGinnis also argues that the District Court erred by not permitting introduction
into evidence correspondence between insurance adjusters.  The District Court properly
held that any probative value of the evidence for the factual questions before the jury was
outweighed by prejudice to Ohio.
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did not bear their burden of proving that the damage was caused by the rock hitting the
building.
The final two arguments presented by McGinnis are that the District Court erred
by dismissing a claim of bad faith against Ohio and by allowing Mr. Robert Neef, an
owner of a disaster restoration firm, to testify as to his personal opinions concerning the
cause of the damage.1  The District Court did not err in entertaining Ohio’s Rule 50
motion at the conclusion of McGinnis’ case on bad faith and adequately explained its
decision dismissing the bad faith claim.  Finally, we see nothing improper in Neef’s
response to the District Court’s clarification of Ohio’s counsel’s question that asked,
“What did you tell Mr. Landow?” and Neef responded:
My personal reaction?  It was very dangerous back
there.  There was a lot of debris that had fallen over the years,
there was an incredible amount of dirt, soil.  There were
rocks.  There was a lot of -- it was something I had never seen
before.
App. II at 225.  This was merely Neef’s observation and there was no reason for prior
qualification of Neef to respond.
III. 
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
                                             
TO THE CLERK:
Please file the foregoing opinion.
      /s/ Dolores K. Sloviter          
Circuit Judge
